By Arnold Koslow
This can be definitely some of the most innovative books written in philosophy. Koslow's structuralist method of common sense opens the opportunity of analogous functions in different components of philosophy. Get this e-book. it's going to swap how you do philosophy.
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Additional resources for A Structuralist Theory of Logic
The reason is just that R implies P as well as Q (the first condition on conjunctions). Moreover, if any member of the structure implies P as well as Q, then it also implies R. This is so because R is the only element of this structure to imply P as well as Q, and R implies R. Thus, the second condition on conjunctions is satisfied. Consequently, R is the conjunction of P and Q, regardless of whether or not it has some special sign embedded in it. Here, then, we have an example of a structure I in which there is a conjunction of P with Q on our account of conjunction, but there are no conjunctions at all to be found in the structure according to Belnap's theory.
Thus far we have been considering suggestions for dropping some of the six conditions for implication relations. To my knowledge there have been no suggestions for additions to the list that do not follow from 40 II IMPLICATION RELATIONS those already given. There is one possible condition, independent of the rest, that seems a natural candidate for addition. It concerns the case in which an implication relation fails to hold. If we think of the special case of a consequence relation on the set of sentences of a first-order language that has conjunction, then we know that if AI> ...